题目：3PL Financing in A Capital-constrained Supply Chain

主讲人：华胜亚（2138cn太阳集团古天乐青年英才）

时间：2019年10月10日(周四)下午3：30

地点：学院301会议室

华胜亚，2138cn太阳集团古天乐青年英才，北京大学光华管理学院博士毕业。研究兴趣包括供应链管理，服务运营。曾在(包括接收)International Journal of Production Economic, 管理科学学报，中国管理科学等期刊发表论文，多次在INFORMS年会，POMS年会，POMS-HK分会进行学术汇报。

摘要：Motivated by the practice that some 3PLs, such as UPS and Eternal Asia, finance retailers' inventories with low interest rate, this paper investigates the design of wholesale price contract and 3PL financing contract in a three-tire supply chain consisting of a supplier, a 3PL, and a newsvendor-like retailer. The retailer, with limit working capital, purchases from the supplier and the finished products are delivered by the 3PL. The retailer can apply for bank financing or 3PL financing when necessary. We model channel members' interaction as a Stackelberg game where the supplier is the leader. Our results show that the 3PL should always finance the retailer with low interest rate to induce the retailer to order more and then the 3PL obtains more profit from the logistics service. The supplier also benefits from 3PL financing by receiving a larger order from the retailer. Compared with bank financing, the retailer is better off under 3PL financing with a lower purchasing cost (ordering cost plus transportation cost) and financing cost if it is not very poor. In our extensions, we conclude that all members' optimal decisions do no change when the 3PL is also capital constrained but can borrow from a bank. When the Stackelberg game leader is the 3PL instead of the supplier, we briefly discuss the retailer's and supplier's problems. Through a numerical experiment, we show that the retailer and 3PL are better off but the supplier is worse off under 3PL leadership.

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